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Abstract: This article offers a multilayered analysis of the subjective perspectives and
experiences of key youth justice stakeholders; exploring the inherent dynamism, contra-
diction, non-linearity, and contentiousness of youth justice policy implementation. We
interrogate how professionals make sense and meaning of policy in the real world and
how professional perspectives drive and shape their contributions to policy implementation
nationally and locally. Contemporaneously, these analyses enable us to critically examine
the caricatures, stereotypes, and assumptions that can (mis)inform common constructions,
representations, and understandings of youth justice policy trajectories, including those
relating to contextual stability, conceptual clarity, robust evidence bases, and purported
foundations in stakeholder consensus.
Keywords: coalface; context; implementation; policy; policymaking, profes-
sionals; youth justice
Despite their significance, there has been only limited critical engagement
with policymaking and implementation in the youth justice field, partic-
ularly with the ‘lived realities’ of the key stakeholders involved in policy
processes.1 Social policymaking in the youth justice context is ‘a complex
arena of social practice, incorporating a diverse range of actors, practices,
relationships and networks’ (Souhami 2015, p.164). Despite its acknowl-
edged complexity, youth justice policymaking, understood as the processes
of establishing strategic direction,making decisions, and defining and iden-
tifying workable solutions to youth crime (Huckel Schneider and Blyth
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2017), has been subjected to a degree of empirical scrutiny (cf. Goldson
and Hughes 2010; Souhami 2011, 2015). However, much less is known
about policy implementation – the animation of policymaking, strategy, and
guidance in practice contexts (often local) by key stakeholders working
with children and families in contact with the youth justice system (YJS).
Consequently, we have limited understanding of the drivers, debates, and
challenges of youth justice policy implementation. The aim of this article is to
make sense of the poorly-understood context of policy implementation in
youth justice in England andWales by examining the interactions between
key stakeholders involved in implementation processes: the policymakers
working in the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (advising gov-
ernment and theMinistry of Justice on policy development issues), and the
practitioners working in local multi-agency youth offending teams (YOTs).
Our object of analysis, therefore, is policymaker-practitioner interactions,
with the overarching aim of understanding how policy2 becomes youth jus-
tice practice in an environment where change is seldom linear, predictable,
or necessarily logical. For example, the trajectory of youth justice has been
characterised by shifting contexts of frequent, politically-driven and non-
linear policy debates regardingwho should be the recipients of youth justice
(for example, the sporadic reconstruction of the minimum age of criminal
responsibility, extending the remit of youth justice prevention/early inter-
vention to younger age groups), how to deliver/implement youth justice (for
example, through a dominant focus on punishment, welfare, justice, diver-
sion, hybrid models) and what organisations and practices should lead and
contribute to this delivery/implementation (for example, police, probation,
social work, education, youth work, the church, the third sector). Taking
policy-practice interactions as the central object of analysis to explore the
drivers, debates, and challenges of youth justice policy implementation,
therefore, necessitates moving beyond analysing policy ‘products’ and into
an exploration of the processes and interactions through which policy is
constructed and implemented in the real world.
Methodology
In order to capture the sometimes contradictory and competing views
of different stakeholders, qualitative interviews were conducted with key
high-level policymakers/shapers who have worked in policy development
environments within and outwith the YJS of England and Wales, to elicit
their unique situated perspectives and experiences. This study pioneered
an innovative co-produced methodology by involving the research partic-
ipants with the process of producing the written output, through an iter-
ative discussion on the construction and interpretation of arising themes.
Two interviews were conducted with each participant (between mid-2018
and early 2019), which explored how differing perspectives are shaped
by the roles, responsibilities, occupational cultures and experiences of key
stakeholders, nationally and contextually. The output from these was ini-
tially constructed by two youth justice-focused critical realist academics,
and reflected back to the participants, allowing them to input directly into
2
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the construction of the narrative, thus becoming co-authors with the aca-
demics. This facilitated a multi-view narrative to emerge, sometimes con-
tradictory, sometimes complementary, illustrating further the issues facing
a diverse policymaking (or influencing) group.
Involving participants in this intensivemanner limits naturally the num-
ber of stakeholders who could take part in order to truly involve them in a
reflective process of interpretation and writing, without this becoming to-
kenistic. Therefore, the decision was taken to interview a limited, but select
group of participants, all of whomhad worked at a very high organisational
level in the YJS in England and Wales as either chairs or chief executives
of policymaking and practitioner organisations. Positionality is therefore
pivotal, determining (as it can) whether the professional perspective of
policymaking is situated on the inside looking out or the outside looking
in. This reflective collaboration was provided by a senior representative
from each of the following:
 Youth Justice Board for England and Wales (YJB) – the non-
departmental public body charged with monitoring the operation of
the YJS, advising government on policy formation/strategic planning,
and identifying and promoting good practice to staff within the multi-
agency YOTs.
 YJB Cymru (YJBC) – a YJB division focusing on the partially-devolved
Welsh context3 and working with the Welsh Government.
 Association of YOT Managers (AYM) – the professional organisation for
heads of service, representing the views of YOTs and exploring processes
of implementing youth justice policy in practice contexts.
Professional background for interview quotes is indicated using organisa-
tional affiliation: YJB, YJBC, AYM. However, the views expressed are not
representative of these organisations; they reflect the professional perspec-
tives and experiences of the reflective collaborators when developing and
particularly implementing policy within these organisations.
Making Sense of Policy from the Inside Out
Policymaking is the most influential process in shaping formal responses to
offending by children aged 10–17 years in the arena known as ‘youth
justice’. Strategies and models of youth justice are manifested in pol-
icy (Yates 2012). Indeed, policy shapes the very nature of youth justice
and the outcomes expected from youth justice (cf. Bateman 2017). How-
ever, contemporary youth justice policymaking has been characterised as
confused/contradictory (see Goldson 2019; Hopkins-Burke 2016; Muncie
2008), excessively politicised (Smith 2011; Smith and Gray 2019) and
even bereft of consolidating principles (Goldson and Muncie 2006) – ar-
guments that coalesce to form the ‘youth governance’ critique of youth
justice (Phoenix 2016). Although these criticisms can tend towards over-
generalisation and caricature of youth justice policy trajectories in order
to emphasise academic argument, the assertion that neither policymaking
3
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nor policy implementation necessarily develop along linear andpredictable
‘pathways’ (Case and Hampson 2019) is unequivocal. Allied to this, pol-
icymaking processes are rarely transparent, consensual or clearly under-
stood in detail. Consequently, the necessity for primary research with key
stakeholders who have been immersed within pivotal policymaking and
implementation processes, debates, and changes is clear. Addressing the
full complexities and challenges of constructing and implementing policy
promotes ecologically-valid understandings of the everyday complexities
of contemporary youth justice and greater appreciation of its possible fu-
ture trajectory (Lawrence 2019). Herein lies a central paradox for youth
justice – the political, policy, and practice imperative to create an evidenced
certainty, security, and stability in a context that is fluid, unpredictable, un-
stable, and evidentially-limited.
Analyses of youth justice policymaking and implementation is facili-
tated by examining the processes and interactions that occur within, and
between, multiple actors at different ecological levels/units of analysis, from
the macro (for example, socio-structural, political, conceptual, strategic) to
the meso (for example, relational, organisational) to the micro (for exam-
ple, occupational, individual). Stakeholder professional experiences and
perspectives within, and between, each level of analysis are explored, con-
trasted, and evaluated as the vehicle for unpacking the complexities of
youth justice policymaking and implementation processes in England and
Wales. Initially, it is instructive to explore the contextual factors that inter-
act with, and influence, the operational realities of policy delivery/transfer
(that is, implementation) at the coalface of practice. These contextual influ-
ences can be situated within broadly-framed socio-historical, economic,
cultural, political, academic/empirical, evidential, policy, and practice
environments.
Macro-level Socio-historical and Socio-economic Influences
Following the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a new ‘effective, efficient and
economical’ YJS of England and Wales was constructed, to be monitored,
guided and managed by the newly-formed YJB. The recipient group for
youth justice (the ‘who’) was reconstructed through the abolition of the
rebuttable presumption of doli incapax, which increased the likelihood of
10- to 13-year-olds being prosecuted, compounded other potentially net-
widening antisocial behaviour and early interventionist agendas (see Bur-
ney 2005). The preferred model for delivering youth justice (the ‘how’)
moved from stereotypical welfare-justice concerns towards risk-based neo-
correctionalist and responsibilising goals for the YJS (Bateman 2017). The
nature of youth justice delivery structures (the ‘what’) was reconstituted by
multi-agency partnerships working in YOTs consisting of representatives
from statutory agencies (police, health, probation, local authority educa-
tion, and social services departments) and other relevant organisations (for
example, youth services, housing, third sector, careers organisations).
While specific policy agendas were expanded (for example, early inter-
ventionism, antisocial behaviour management, community interventions,
4
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intensive supervision), the general trajectory of youth justice policy ap-
peared to be stable, certain and secure – consistent with the need for
predictability and control espoused by the central components of the ‘new
youth justice’ (Goldson 2000) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. How-
ever, from 2003 onwards, there was considerable debate within the gov-
ernment about the degree to which the initial responses to youth crime
and antisocial behaviour risked demonising children.4 Once the punitive
focus of the police-led ‘Street Crime Initiative’ and ‘Offences brought to
justice’ programmes ‘ran out of steam from 2007 onwards’ (YJB), the fo-
cus on diversion away from the YJS and into more appropriate support
services gained momentum and a sharp reduction in first-time entrants,
and then children in custody, began. This change, not in step with the
initial punitive turn of New Labour, indicates that policy debate can ex-
ist within government, yet other key stakeholders involved in the shaping
and delivery of policy (for example, YJB, YOTs) may mediate centralised
policy prescriptions locally (that is, on the ground) in order to lead policy
development (through its implementation) away from its original direction
(Smith and Gray 2019).
The merits of systemic diversion gained widespread popularity and
additional support among national and local policymakers as the cold wind
of austerity began to blow through all tiers of government from 2009 (Kelly
and Armitage 2015; Gray and Smith 2019; Smith 2020). For example, the
Legal Aid Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012
engineered a wholesale revision of the out-of-court sentencing process
for children in England and Wales, accelerating the use of diversionary
practice and dramatically decreasing the (already falling) numbers of
first-time entrants into the YJS (Ministry of Justice/Youth Justice Board
2019). The post-2009 macro-level socio-economic crisis of austerity in
the UK, exacerbated by the socio-political crisis of Brexit, compounded
the contextual conflict and ambivalence in youth justice (Bateman 2014;
Byrne and Brooks 2015; Levitas 2012; Yates 2012). Since that point,
successive new governments and a constant stream of justice ministers
have felt pressure to affect policy change nationally, including ‘to be seen to
make or revise youth justice policy’ (YJB). The desire for change, however,
has been limited in policy terms by severely restricted economic means
and an abiding political insecurity – coalescing into contextual instability
and a degree of political inertia (McAra 2017; Smith 2020). The political
and media compulsion for policy dynamism in youth justice nationally,
therefore, has diminished demonstrably in the current context because
‘other political issues such as Brexit are taking precedence and masking
all other political priorities in electoral terms’ (YJBC). However, reducing
funding has also forced practice change – different ways of working at the
coalface because of fewer staff (and often loss of external agency engage-
ment/secondments), but also falling numbers of ‘statutory’ (court-directed)
cases.
Despite the demonstrable, sustained successes of (elements of) youth
justice policy and practice (for example, diversion) prior to and since
the onset of austerity measures (Yates 2012), macro-level economic and
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political insecurities have translated into youth justice through (meso) or-
ganisational and (micro) professional/occupational insecurities regarding
role, longevity and sustainability (see ‘In Focus’ below). Key stakeholders
such as the YJB and YOTs have faced constant rounds of economic cuts
without equivalent reductions in their performance measures and expec-
tations, accompanied by frequent threats regarding future abolition.
In Focus: The Political Context of Government-YJB Relations
The YJB has operated with a perennial role ambiguity since its incep-
tion – constantly running the risk of being ‘cut adrift’ from a policy-
influencing role and forfeiting its legitimacy in the eyes of practitioners
if it is overly-critical of, or distanced from, government (Souhami 2011),
while attempting to retain independence from government and credibil-
ity with those same practitioners.
The YJB’s role ambiguity has been compounded by long-term inse-
curities concerning its position. Notably, governmental resistance to YJB
autonomy and independence has been a significant, sustained barrier to
the constructive politics-policy relationship in youth justice:
. . . the civil service hates non-departmental public bodies like the YJB because
they have the freedom to say and do things that civil servants don’t, possibly off
message, so resentment comes to the surface. They [government] would prefer
the YJB to be closer to ministers and to be more accountable. (YJBC)
Successive UK government reviews have indicated that the role of the
YJB should be incrementally diminished through recommendations in
the Breaking the Cycle Green Paper (Ministry of Justice 2010) for its abo-
lition as a cost-cutting measure. Subsequently the YJB was included in a
long list of non-governmental public bodies to be abolished in the Pub-
lic Bodies Bill published in 2010. Spirited opposition to this proposal
in the House of Lords, based on the successes of the whole YJS in ‘net
narrowing’ forced the government to withdraw the proposed abolition
in November 2011 before the bill was enacted (UK Government 2011).
More recently, the triennial ‘Functions Review’ of all non-departmental
public bodies, conducted by the Ministry of Justice (Ministry of Justice
2012b), recommended a reduction of YJB independence to increase ac-
countability to ministers. In February 2017, the government used the
publication of the report of the Youth Custody Improvement Board to
strip the YJB of much of its role and influence over children in custody,
leading to a significant reduction in size and reach of the YJB.
Indeed, to some, the UK government increasingly operates ‘as if it is
trying to correct the mistake of setting up the YJB quango first place’
(YJBC); exerting continual pressure on the YJB to ‘prove’ the value of
its policy advice in evidential and statistical terms, although this constant
pressure ‘is seldom understood by practice’ (YJBC). Constant pressure
can be a significant barrier to policy progress, often due to the short-
termism/impatience of government for demonstrable, evidenced policy
impact or the short-termism/dynamism of government policy agendas
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and the tenures of staff charged with implementing policy change (for
example, the constant turnover of justice ministers):
There has been a constant short-termpolitical pressure on theYJB to demonstrate
what works, without the necessary time to develop understandings. You’ll never
be at the cutting edge because you have to wait for evidence and reflect. (YJBC)
Souhami (2011) nuanced these types of allegations by identifying the
positive effects of the ‘inherently ambiguous’ nature of the YJB’s role.
Role ambiguity, purportedly, has facilitated the extension of YJB influ-
ence and intervention, the extent of which will only be determined (it is
argued) once the YJB has ceased operation. Souhami’s study suggested
that the YJB has thrived in its role of dual influence, offering ‘indepen-
dent’ policy critique and guidance to government while drawing on this
independence and distance to gain credibility with practitioners when
providing advice and support. It was clear that the YJB was able to ex-
ploit (in a positive sense) its role ambiguity to ‘slip between positions’ and
to exert ‘influence with different audiences both within and outside the
youth justice system’ (cf. Case 2014; Souhami 2011, p.7).
Detailed analyses of the interactions and relationships between, and within,
different macro-level contexts (for example, socio-historic, economic,
national-local) indicate that they are complex, contested, and dynamic, as
are the interactions and relationships within, and between, different stake-
holder organisations and occupational groups (for example, government-
YJB, police-YOTs, YOT managers-YOT practitioners) that (co)operate to
deliver youth justice in these contexts. Therefore, our formative conclusion
following initial contextual analysis is that in youth justice, ‘policy-making is
a complex, not always rational process, led by many people at many differ-
ent levels’ (YJB). However, notwithstanding their undoubted complexity,
contextual influences on policymaking must be realised and animated in
practice through policy implementation nationally and locally. The actual-
isation and structure of policy appears most often at the coalface of youth
justice practice.
Coalface Influences: Analysing Meso-relations and Micro-practice
It is at the ‘coalface’ of everyday practice that youth justice stakeholders,
typically staff working in the YJB, YOTs (for example, managers, prac-
titioners) and the secure estate (custodial institutions), attempt to make
sense of youth justice policy through its implementation. As stated, such
‘sense-making’ activity is inherently complex as it is underpinned by a
paradoxical quest for certainty in an uncertain arena. However, it is at the
practice coalface that youth justice practitioners work with children, par-
ents, and other key stakeholders to actualise policy in their local context
(that is, policy implementation), often through mediation and moderation
processes that are themselves supported (even facilitated) by the YJB in the
spirit of empowerment and encouraging local ownership of youth justice.
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The YJB remit to develop consistent standards for the practice imple-
mentation of policy has been animated (given life) by the performance
management of YOTs, largely through the collection of statistical data on
workload and the attainment of ‘Key Performance Indicators’ (the main
three currently being reductions in first-time entrants to the YJS, reoffend-
ing, and custody) – all framed by the provision of detailed practice guidance
relating to National Standards, case management and evidence-based ‘Key
Elements of Effective Practice’ (Stephenson and Allen 2018; Youth Justice
Board 2008). It is in this climate of performance management that the
YJB was accused by critics (academic and practitioner) of being excessively
prescriptive and restrictive at times in its policy and practice guidance,
promoting technical and mechanical processes that neglected practitioner
expertise and discretion (cf. Case and Hester 2010; Pitts 2003). Localised
discretion and autonomy built into the statutory requirements of the 1998
Act were rendered less visible or feasible at YOT-level, it was alleged, due
to the degree of centralised practice guidance-cum-prescription (see Pitts
2003, for example), while YJB discretion and autonomy (mandated by
government) was able to flourish, largely in the pre-austerity era (Hopkins-
Burke 2016).However, in the subsequent decade, YOTs have been afforded
increasing local discretion/autonomy (in terms of decision making rather
than financial control), due, in part, to the retrenchment of YJB resource
and influence, along with the drive for localisation (see also Yates 2012):
From late 2008, there was a conscious repositioning of the role of the YJB in respect
of YOTs. This gained a lot of momentum under the Coalition Government, not least
because it saved money, but principally because it conformed with the ‘Big Society,
small government’ mantra of David Cameron, the Prime Minister at that time.
(YJB)
The concurrent movement of retrenchment and localisation is reflective
of macro-level economic and political contextual changes impacting at the
meso-level of coalface relations and micro-level of coalface practice. Staff
discretion and autonomy at the coalface have been enhanced by contempo-
rary policy changes such as the reintroduction of a diversion focus (Ministry
of Justice 2012a) and the reinvigoration of the assessment-intervention
framework (Youth Justice Board 2014). It has been asserted that: ‘At the
level of central government practice there are now far fewer targets’ and
local youth justice agencies are now ‘more able to fashion a locally relevant
response’ (Phoenix 2016, p.124).
Meso-level Policy-Practice Relations
Contextual influences acting on coalface practice illuminates a new rela-
tional sphere of influence upon youth justice policymaking, most notably at
the meso-level of actualising and implementing policy (the policy-practice
relationship). The task of translating and reconciling government require-
ments into user-friendly guidance at any given point poses challenges to
effective policy transfer in the real world of practice. These challenges have
been realised in at least two areas:
8
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 the policy-practice relationship/divide between the YJB and YOTs (ev-
idenced through their ongoing interactions) and the ongoing issue of
local discretion in mediating policy guidance through practice imple-
mentation;
 examination of YJB-YOT relations and interactions highlights an impor-
tant challenge to policy implementation at the coalface – the potential
for a rhetoric-reality divide.
Political and policy rhetoric may overstate the appropriateness and ef-
fectiveness of certain youth justice approaches and prioritise particular
concepts in the pursuit of success; but where their underpinning evidence
bases are poorly-understood and under-developed, policy cannot be ade-
quately realised in practice (cf. Case 2018; Haines and Case 2018; Smith
2016). It could also be the case that policy directions may be ill-informed
or under-developed when they emerge from government, leaving the YJB
(and YOTs) with the job of making sense of policy prescriptions, mod-
erating, mediating them and even overriding them in local (micro-level)
practice contexts (Case 2018;Muncie 2014) – indicative of a divide between
policy rhetoric and practice realities (see ‘In Focus’ below).
In Focus: The Policy-Practice Divide as Rhetoric or Reality?
The potential for a policy-practice divide is exacerbated where relations
between the YJB (policy advisor) and YOTs (policy implementer) are
strained or hampered, notably when coalface practitioners perceive that
their views are being neglected in policy development mechanisms:
The YJB upper echelons of old, pre-austerity, never talked to practitioners be-
cause they didn’t want to get their hands dirty. I was once told by the Chair of the
YJB at that time that I was ‘a dangerous man to know’. But dangerous to who?
Where you have this approach, it leads to developing policy in isolation from
reality. (AYM)
The accusation is clear – neglect and underemphasis of the voices of
stakeholders in policy development and implementation (for example,
not inviting AYM representatives to YJB meetings) risks ‘creating policy
through the lens of government rather than reflecting the experiences
of the sector’ (AYM). Where practice managers are considered ‘danger-
ous’, therefore, it is because (in their view) they interact with government
and YJB in contexts ‘where the lens has been taken off and practice
views are unfiltered’ (AYM), thus they reflect the perceived realities and
professional agendas/biases of all staff at the coalface working with chil-
dren. Indeed, neglect of views from practice can engender a real sense of
detachment and disaffection among practitioners; a feeling that ‘policy-
makers do not have to wrestle with the everyday obstacles to implement
in policy in practice. They are not at the sharp end and do not have to
deal with policy fallout’ (AYM).
Professional perspectives of the YJB as somehow detached from prac-
tice realities can be refuted from the YJB standpoint, as they:
9
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fail to acknowledge the lengths we [YJB] went to in the past to ensure that we were
led by and staffed by a very large number of people with recent YOT or Secure
Estate experience, and to only develop new material in co-production with YOT
and custody staff. (YJB)
The former YJB managers and senior leaders interviewed acknowl-
edged that YOT staff felt (at times) that YJB products were alien or
over-prescriptive; they re-emphasise that the organisation ‘went to huge
lengths to involve YOT people . . . matters improved greatly once the
AYM Chair galvanised the Association of YOT Managers into a rep-
resentative body’ (YJB). Consultation with practitioners and managers
was essential from a policy perspective. In Wales, ‘we [YJBC] never did
anything without involving practitioners. I used to go to every YOTMan-
agers Cymru meeting, we always had YOTs and academics on our Youth
Justice Advisory Panel’ (YJBC), while in England ‘We [YJB] were con-
stantly talking to practitioners and their managers. It was a key personal
objective’ (YJB).
Further arguments for constructive, supportive YJB-YOT relations (in
the Welsh context) come from the Welsh perspective:
We just tried to set up the best conditions, the practitioners did the work. There
was though a lot of behind the scenes work to try and protect the grant/the
prevention funding in negotiation/battle with the MoJ and Home Office. YOTs
never saw all the hidden engagement with other government departments to
persuade them to include regard for children who offend in their policies. (YJBC)
The views expressed by interviewees, when analysed at the meso-level, in-
dicate a degree of both rhetoric and reality regarding the policy-practice di-
vide, influenced by occupational/professional perspective, experience and
insight into the inner workings of their respective daily practices. There
are clear rhetorical differences in the extent to which stakeholders feel that
policymakers have supported practice in the development and implemen-
tation of policy at the coalface level, the extent to which stakeholders have
experienced this support at the coalface and the extent to which different
stakeholders feel justified in claiming credit for successful youth justice
outcomes. The general picture is one suggesting a degree of cognitive
dissonance in the rhetorical self-identities and professional reflections of
different stakeholder groups, contributing to a meso-level relational divide
between policymakers and practitioners in their perceptions of reality. The
associated challenges to policymaking and implementation are, or course,
shaped by occupational cultures, but also by the respective professional
agendas and pressures experienced by different groups. It is apparent that
macro-level socio-political pressures experienced by the YJB and meso-
level localised pressures experienced by YOTs, interact and (can) clash
when mediated and moderated through meso-level relationships between
the two parties and their external stakeholders (for example, government,
local authorities, children in the YJS).
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Practice Perceptions of the YJB at the Micro-level
The potential for disparate professional perspectives regarding the realities
of policy implementation can be exacerbated by negative YOT perceptions
of the YJB function and utility. Previous criticisms of New Labour policy
as overly-prescriptive have been compounded by perceptions of a lack of
meaningful consultation (with practitioners) in policy development of a
rapidly diminishing relevance and influence for the YJB at the national
level. There has been a sense of the YJB soliciting professional perspectives
on how best to understand and implement largely preformed policies,
rather than consulting (as standard) in detail with a broader range of
practitioners at the policy development stage. From the perspective of
YOT managers: ‘it is difficult to construct and test policy ideas before they
become policy if you are not consulted properly during the development,
something that the AYM has regularly complained about’ (AYM).
Any perceived marginalisation of practice perspectives runs the risk of
creating a relational divide between the YJB and YOTs, with meso-level
managers and micro-level practitioners increasingly feeling that they are
on the outside (of policymaking processes) looking in, essentially ‘left out
in the wilderness to make sense of policy locally on our own’ (AYM). This,
in turn, risks further weakening the degree to which practice views the
YJB as relevant, as practitioners work less frequently and collaboratively
with YJB policymakers, while simultaneously exercising increased local
discretion, such that their perceived credibility and influence of the YJB
(cf. Souhami 2011) diminishes at the local level. According to the AYM
practitioner-manager interviewee:
the YJB has blunt teeth, especially nowadays when youth justice is so insignificant as
a political issue and youth justice policy has increasingly become part of piecemeal,
integrated approaches locally, so the traditional YOT model is being lost. The lack
of policy from the centre and a lack of local awareness within the YJB has created a
huge gap at the coalface in how policy is realised. More than ever before, the sector
is led by practice.
Marginalising practitioner views, where this is perceived to happen (be-
cause perception clearly shapes attitudes and behaviours on the ground),
can fuel practitioner (micro-level) and manager (meso-level) feelings that
the YJB’s relevance and influence on policy and practice is diminishing.
YOT managers assert that: ‘the YJB may think that they still have strong
links to practice, but they are not at the coalface of youth justice in 2019’
(AYM). The consequent obstacle to policy development that can result
from this is that YJB policymaking can be distanced from practice realities
because: ‘they [YJB] don’t know what they don’t know . . . the people who
do this job on a daily basis [YOT staff] are more important than the people
[YJB] who think they do it’ (AYM). That being said, there has been a tan-
gible shift in policymaking processes since the onset of economic austerity
measures and political insecurities (for example, around Brexit), charac-
terised by amovement towards increased localisation and local/practitioner
discretion (Drake, Fergusson and Briggs 2014) – an explicit policy choice
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in the political context of the Ministry of Justice (2010) Breaking the Cycle
Green Paper.
Increased Localisation (Meso-level) and Practitioner Discretion
(Micro-level)
In the current socio-political context, creating new youth justice policy has
been deprioritised as a political issue, perhaps to its lowest point ever (cf.
Case and Haines 2020; Smith 2020), while YJB policy mechanisms (for
example, providing effective practice guidance through policy products
and face-to-face input) have become increasingly localised. Whether this
shift constitutes a pragmatic response to austerity or the extension of early
progressive partnership approaches on the part of the YJB remains moot;
likely to be an uneasy mixture of both policy drivers:
Policy-makers know that practitioners need to interpret and apply their policies
and that they have the flexibility to wriggle and to reinterpret. We need to make
sense of national policy at local level. This can be a used as a get out clause for policy
makers when policy does not work in practice. Since austerity, practitioners have
had to organise ourselves. (AYM)
One clear policy rebuttal of accusation to this perceived abrogation of
responsibility is that practitioners also appear to ‘want it both ways’, an
accusation acknowledged by all interviewees, including the AYM profes-
sional:
some practitioners will whinge when they sense prescription, but also whinge when
they need help, so the YJB can’t win.
This view was echoed by policy developers, one of whom reflected that:
Actually, some practitioners still love centralisation, whilst others are emboldened
by the discretionary elements of guidance. (YJBC)
Notwithstanding the espoused centralisation-discretion debate in youth
justice, the last decade in particular has witnessed an emerging reciprocity
and levelling-out of YJB-YOT relations. Over this period, the YJB and
YJBC has expressed a growing desire to incorporate practitioner views
into policy development processes – an explicit shift from the oft-mooted
‘culture of dependency created [by YJB] through prescribing that so much
for so long’ (AYM). In 2018, there was a wholesale change in the member-
ship of the YJB, with the incorporation of a cadre of fresh members with
extensive practice experience and credentials in child-first youth justice,
including former YOT managers and police officers, a former children’s
commissioner and a practice-facing academic researcher. The YJB could
argue, of course, that these reforms were extensions of its longer-term
commitment to identifying, disseminating, and promoting good practice
by working in partnership with practitioners and local YOTs. It is entirely
possible, therefore, that the YJB and government view the post-1998 legacy
of local mediation along a continuum ranging from a negative inevitability
distorting policy to a positive beneficial process of reconstruction to suit
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local contexts. Where YOTs may view policy documentation as prescrip-
tive and restrictive (at least in pre-austerity times), perhaps necessitating
‘positive subversion’ (AYM), the YJB could argue that it offers a notional,
foundational framework for good practice, open to adaptation locally by
expert practitioners – a flexible, discretionary ‘certainty’ – more flexible
guidance than prescriptive instruction. For example:
We [YJB] recommend discretion in practice, but led by our standards framework
and principles – that way YOTs feel comfortable using their judgement. They
[YOTs] have discretion and can adapt as long as it’s evidenced. Now we have a
climate of professionals questioning whether they are doing the best things in the
best way. (YJBC)
YOT perspectives can actually support this assertion of the utility of in-
creasing practitioner discretion and flexibility in the mediation and imple-
mentation of policy, with practitioners arguing that:
you don’t just apply the framework you’re given, you use it to help you to under-
stand exactly what is going on for a child and to identify the information you need
. . . [therefore] the good thing about youth justice on the ground is that it has railed
against rigidity in responses to offending. (AYM)
Herein lies just one example of how a process of policy implementation
(employing practitioner discretion) can be equally valued by stakeholder
groups, yet viewed differently based on professional perspective. It is pos-
sible to argue that both ‘sides’ (policy and practice) are essentially making
the same argument – that there is utility in enhancing practitioner discre-
tion as a tool to realise centralised policy guidance, while integrating local
specificity, which is a win-win for a progressive, child-focused youth justice
(cf. Case and Hampson 2019).
Resistance and Reticence to Change at the Micro-level of Practice
Professionally, local practice resistance to policy change and innovation can
function as a relational obstacle to successful policy implementation. From
the policy perspective, for example, there can be a degree of unnecessary
resistance from YOT practitioners, as if ‘a gut reaction to change is to find
a reason to not be comfortable with it’ (YJBC). For example, the YJB circa
2009–13 experienced resistance to changes in National Standards, such
as the removal of quantified assessment scoring. At that time, there was a
professional sense that:
often, even when you [YJB] are trying for progressive change (often against the
wishes of certain politicians), sections of practice would rather not take on the risk
that discretion brings. Practitioners aren’t a homogeneous lump – they are [micro-
level] individuals with different experiences and views. (YJBC)
However, what is perceived and experienced as practitioner resistance
by the YJB could be, at the coalface reality, more a case of practitioners
becoming invested and competent in a particular way of working (for ex-
ample, risk assessment), then losing confidence when required to think
and work differently. For example, practitioners guided to incorporate
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positive factors into assessments (to assess and foster desistance from of-
fending using a strengths-based model) have tended to revert back to
overemphasising risk factors instead. Therefore, ‘resistance’ can be con-
structed as reticence and uncertainty in the face of limited information and
guidance, which encourages ‘defensive decisions rather than defensible
decisions’ (AYM). Reticence/uncertainty is exacerbated when training for
practice changes (for example, to the assessment-intervention framework)
is cascaded down to practitioners from poorly-informed and/or under-
funded managers, resulting in a paucity of appropriate training and poor
understanding of the underlying model- and evidence-bases (Hampson
2018).
Perceptions of Innovation: Meso- and Micro-level differences
Relational gaps between policy and practice, combined with resistance and
reticence to change from some practice quarters, can also engender con-
trasting professional perspectives regarding ‘innovation’ in the youth jus-
tice policy field. YOTmanagers and practitioners alike can view purported
‘innovation’ as something of a misnomer or policy spin on the part of gov-
ernment, leading to the criticism that ‘a lot of so-called new practice is
actually a rebranding of old, proven practice . . . new and innovative prac-
tice isn’t always necessary. If practice works, that should be enough’ (AYM).
Conversely, policy stakeholders may perceive policy and practice change
as ‘new’, innovative, and necessary in the current context of youth jus-
tice, rather than needing to be original and groundbreaking in the history
of youth justice. However, an unfortunate consequence can be that any
lack of practitioner support for proposed changes can be experienced by
policymakers as resistance:
the problem comes when practitioners react to recommendations for policy and
practice changes by saying ‘well we used to do that’, as if that is a reason not to do it
now. This often leads to the unconstructive opinion that because something is not
entirely new then it is not innovation and shouldn’t be done. (YJBC)
Moreover, policy can seek to challenge and address this resistance through
the provision of guidance (and related training) to practice – central to
the remit of the YJB and a priority that they fully embraced post-Crime
and Disorder Act 1998 with a stream of performance management and
practice guidance documentation, intended to be supportive rather than
prescriptive:
It was never a question of practitioners trying to re-learn lessons from the past. Most
of the leadership of the YJB had been practitioners in the 1980s and were acutely
aware of the past successes. Conversely, many of the millennial and near-millennial
practitioners didn’t retain this knowledge. (YJB)
However, it is difficult to see how post-1998 practitioners could be in a po-
sition to ‘retain’ knowledge from an earlier era (for example, akin to evolu-
tionary psychological development of collective knowledge) when their ex-
perience has been largely ‘hard-schooling’ in risk approaches, emphasised
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by supportive, risk-informed practitioner-focused qualifications like the
Professional Certificate in Effective Practice (cf. Hampson 2018). When
related guidance is viewed by practitioners as highly prescriptive and ‘for
their own benefit’, relational and perceptual disparities are compounded.
The YJB can appear patronising, overly-paternal and out of touch with
practice realities, illustrated by the accusation that previous incarnations
of the YJB:
treated YOT managers like children involved with the YJS. We were talked at, not
worked with. Doing this, the YJB couldn’t possibly hope to develop a realistic view
of everyday practice. (AYM)
There appears to be an unnecessary polarisation of professional perspec-
tives here, when in reality, both sides are pursuing effective practice devel-
opment to benefit children who offend. This unhelpful distancing is clearly
illustrated in contrasting professional views on the practitioner discretion-
policy prescription debate. On the one hand, local practice mediation of
policy guidelines could be perceived as a resistant, militant ‘positive sub-
version of the more stupid elements of YJB prescription . . . essentially
sabotage’5 (AYM) and/or sustained and evidence-based confidence in ex-
isting practices. However, from the YJB perspective, any perception of sub-
version appears unhelpful and unnecessary, particularly in a collaborative
context where policymakers seek to enable and facilitate local discretion.
Consequently, it could be questioned: ‘what is there to subvert? We [YJB]
have always encouraged practitioners to push boundaries and have wanted
them to do the best they can’ (YJBC). Professional perspectives can differ,
yet the goals and outcomes can remain the same for both groups and for
the ultimate recipients of these challenges – children.6
Conclusion: Challenges to Youth Justice Policy
So what, and who, are the influences, drivers, and challenges that shape the
processes of youth justice policymaking and policy implementation? It is
abundantly clear from the foregoing analyses that the domain of youth jus-
tice is not a coherent singularity (Garland and Young 1983), but comprises
multiple institutions, organisations, practices, relations, and professional
agendas through which policymaking and implementation are pursued
(cf. Phoenix 2016). A number of complex challenges to (the drivers and
influences of) youth justice policymaking and implementation have been
identified from the critical reflections of key stakeholders; challenges that
are interpreted, experienced, and responded to differently dependent on
professional perspective or ‘lens’, culture, agenda, and context. Indeed,
certain challenges are more prevalent and relevant to certain stakeholder
organisations than others, for example, the YJB necessity to develop con-
structive meso-level relations with government and YOT requirements to
make sense of (macro-level) national policy within (meso-level) relations
with children. Processes of addressing and resolving these shared and
occupation-specific challenges manifest at the macro-, meso-, and micro-
levels of policy and practice, often dynamic, contested, and contingent
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on professional perspective and context. Processes of policy and practice
change over time have been characterised by conflict and ambivalence
within and between stakeholder groups as to their nature, meaning, and
appropriate responses to them.
Following analyses of stakeholder perspectives and experiences, the
identified key challenges and processes of change in youth justice present
as, inter alia: contextual instabilities resulting from radical legislative
changes, socio-economic upheaval (for example, sweeping austerity), and
socio-political insecurities, combined with coalface relational challenges
within, and between, stakeholder groups pursuing policy transfer within
different contexts. Resultant insecurities, uncertainties, and fluidities con-
spire (at critical moments) to impact upon organisational and occupational
identities, their perceived roles and responsibilities of professional groups
and their perceived capacity to exercise discretion and the willingness to
collaborate with other agencies – all components that can influence the
successful translation and transfer of policy requirements into the realities
of the practice world.
It is appropriate to conclude, we feel, by drawing attention to the devel-
oping policy-practice collaboration between the YJB and YOTs, indicative
of a constructive trajectory of travel for the recent past, present, and future
of youth justice policy and practice. This article has deliberately drawn out
areas of consensus and disagreement between YJB and YOT (manager
and practitioner) conceptions of co-influence, with each side able to cite
examples of when non/collaboration has shaped policy – showing that both
perceptions carry weight. It is arguable that these tensions are an almost
inevitable product of different professional backgrounds and perceptions,
but do not indicate, in themselves, potentially damaging areas of dispute.
Often, differences and contradictions can be perceived as shared ‘chal-
lenges’, with different stakeholder groups committed to collaborating in
their resolution. The extent of success for youth justice in resolving these
challenges is supported statistically by a decade of downward (annual) tra-
jectories in the economic cost of youth justice and both the numbers of
children offending and those entering the YJS for the first time (Ministry
of Justice/Youth Justice Board 2019). It is instructive here to note the re-
flective, conciliatory and respectful tone of the conclusion from the coalface
practitioner-manager interviewee:
the YJB contributed to the conditions of this success, although practitioners made
this policy work bymediating and then implementing it in partnershipwith children
and local agencies . . . However, youth justice is better off for having the YJB [and]
despite the complex challenges posed by different organisations within the system,
the overall story of youth justice is positive. (AYM)
This spirit of constructive collaboration between stakeholders in pursuing
youth justice success is neatly encapsulated by the YJB interviewee, who
reflected that:
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I certainly don’t think that the YJB claims exclusive responsibility for positive
developments. I am absolutely confident that we always attributed the heavy lifting
to YOTs. The point is that both parties played their parts but at different levels.
There appears to be a reflective, open-minded and evidence-based ma-
turing across the youth justice context on the part of both the YJB (for
example, increasing practitioner and academic involvement in policy de-
velopment mechanisms) and YOTs (for example, practitioners seeking and
developing more understanding of, and input to, policy processes). The
most optimistic (hopefully realistic) conclusion to be drawn from analyses of
the previous two decades of youth justice policy development in England
and Wales is of a progressive context with stakeholders working within,
and across, differing levels of influence and increasingly collaborating to
address the dynamic contextual and coalface challenges to policymaking
and implementation for the continued benefit of their priority service
users – children.
Notes
1 Notable exceptions are the ethnographic research studies that examined policymak-
ing processes of officials working for, and with, the YJB in England and Wales
(Souhami 2011, 2015) and the YJB in Wales/YJBC (Case (2014), a study guided
by Souhami’s work). Both researchers examined how the dynamic, ambiguous and
quasi-independent position/role of the organisation provided it with the flexibility to
shape policy formation and the youth justice architecture through which policy is
implemented (Case 2014; see also Souhami 2015).
2 For the purposes of developing a coherent and comprehensive critical frame-
work for analysing policy implementation throughout this article, youth justice
policy is understood as official government legislation, including its underpinning
Green/White Papers, policy briefings, and ministerial speeches at national level (that
is, ‘policy products’), along with strategic and practice guidance and opinion dis-
seminated to youth justice staff by government agencies, inspectorates and non-
departmental/governmental public and third sector bodies. Locally, policy is animated
by organisational strategies such as the annual statutory Youth Justice Plans andCrime
and Disorder Reduction Plans (called Community Safety Plans inWales) in every local
authority area. Relatedly, policymakers nationally include key stakeholder individuals
working across governmental sectors, from non-governmental public bodies, and in
academia, while local policymakers include managers and practitioners working in,
and with, YOTs and the police service.
3 Youth and criminal justice issues are not policy areas devolved to the Welsh Govern-
ment, although related areas such as education, social care, and health are devolved.
4 This led to the development of amore nuanced position, shaped under the auspices of
‘Every Child Matters’ (in England) and ‘Children First, Offender Second’ (in Wales),
which encouraged the development of more early intervention schemes but also
diversion, originally rejected by the ‘No More Excuses’ mantra of the 1997 White
Paper (Home Office 1997).
5 The local practice example given here was that of parenting orders, perceived as
‘stupid, badly-crafted and ill-conceived’ (AYM), to the extent that he convinced lo-
cal magistrates to not even consider them – something only made possible through
professional experience ‘of the nuances and subtleties of local practice’ (AYM).
6 The much–neglected role of children in youth justice policy development and evalu-
ation will be examined in detail in a forthcoming article. There is simply insufficient
space in the current article to do justice to this complex issue.
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